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ABSTRACT 
Simultaneous Inter- and Intra-Group Conflicts 
by Johannes Münster * 
This paper models the trade-off between production and appropriation in the 
presence of simultaneous inter- and intra-group conflicts. The model exhibits a 
'group cohesion effect': if the contest between the groups becomes more 
decisive, or contractual incompleteness between groups becomes more 
serious, the players devote fewer resources to the intra-group conflict. 
Moreover, there is also a 'reversed group cohesion effect': if the intra-group 
contests become less decisive, or contractual incompleteness within groups 
becomes less serious, the players devote more resources to the inter-group 
contest. The model also sheds new light on normative questions. I derive exact 
conditions for when dividing individuals in more groups leads to more productive 
and less appropriative activities. Furthermore, I show that there is an optimal 
size of the organization which is determined by a trade-off between increasing 
returns to scale in production and increasing costs of appropriative activities.  
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Simultane Konflikte innerhalb und zwischen Gruppen 
Dieser Aufsatz modelliert den Trade-Off zwischen Produktion und Aneignung in 
Situationen, die sowohl von Konflikten innerhalb von Gruppen, als auch von 
Konflikten zwischen den Gruppen gekennzeichnet sind. Das Modell beleuchtet 
einen Gruppen-Kohäsions-Effekt: Wenn der Wettkampf zwischen Gruppen 
schärfer wird, oder Probleme unvollständiger Verträge zwischen Gruppen 
zunehmen, dann wenden die Spieler weniger Ressourcen in den internen 
Konflikten auf. Außerdem gibt es auch einen umgekehrten Gruppen-Kohäsions-
Effekt: Werden die Wettkämpfe innerhalb der Gruppen weniger scharf, oder 
Probleme unvollständiger Verträge innerhalb der Gruppen weniger gravierend, 
dann verwenden die Spieler mehr Energie auf den Wettkampf zwischen den 
Gruppen. Der Aufsatz wirft auch ein neues Licht auf normative Fragen der opti-
malen Gestaltung von Organisationen. Ich leite eine exakte Bedingung her, 
unter der eine Aufteilung der Individuen in mehr Gruppen zu mehr produktiven 
Anstrengungen und weniger Aneignungsaktivitäten führt. Außerdem zeige ich, 
dass es eine optimale Größe von Organisationen gibt, die durch simultane inter- 
und intra- Gruppen Konflikte gekennzeichnet sind. Die optimale Größe be-
stimmt sich durch einen Trade-Off zwischen steigenden Skalenerträgen in der 
Produktion einerseits und zunehmenden Aneignungsaktivitäten andererseits.  
 
1 Introduction
Vilfredo Pareto famously remarked that men utilize their e¤orts in two di¤er-
ent ways: to produce economic goods, or to appropriate goods produced by
others.1 The corresponding trade o¤ between productive and appropriative
activities has been studied extensively in the recent literature on endogenous
property rights (for a survey, see Skaperdas 2003).
Appropriative activities take place at di¤erent levels. For example, within
the EU, the member countries compete for subsidies. At the same time, there
is a contest over the allocation of subsidies within the countries. Or, within
a rm, several departments compete for resources, and in addition there is
a contest about the allocation of resources within the departments. The
common structure is that there are appropriative conicts between certain
groups (states, departments, etc.), and appropriative conicts within these
groups. The aim of this paper is to provide a model of situations like these.
What determines the amount of conict within groups and between groups,
respectively? And what is the optimal design of an organization (be it a
federal state or a rm), taking into account that organizational structure has
an e¤ect on appropriative activities?
In order to study these questions, I set up a model which is related to
the conict models of Hirshleifer (1988, 2001) and Skaperdas (1992). These
models are motivated by some kind of contractual incompleteness which leads
to the absence of well dened and enforced property rights. Thus, individ-
uals can engage into appropriative activities and face a trade-o¤ between
production and appropriation. The novel feature of my model is that I ex-
plicitly study simultaneous inter- and intra-group conicts. Individuals are
partitioned in groups, and utilize their resources in three di¤erent ways: for
production, for appropriation in a contest between groups, and for appropri-
ation in a contest within their own group. The contractual incompleteness
problems may be di¤erent between groups and within groups. I model this in
a stylized way, taking contractual incompleteness as an exogenous parame-
ter, and being agnostic as to whether it is smaller or greater between groups
or within groups. Moreover, the technology of conict (see Hirshleifer 1991)
may be di¤erent in the intra-group contest from that in the inter-group con-
test, since these contests are usually fought with di¤erent instruments. Again
I model this by a parameterization, taking an agnostic point of view about
which of the contests is the more decisive.
Situations of inter-group conict have long been studied in the social sci-
ences, especially in sociology, psychology, and anthropology. One seemingly
11971 (1927), Chapter VIII, §17, p. 341.
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robust nding is that inter-group competition leads to increased cohesive-
ness within a group (see Fisher 1990, chapter 4, for a survey). My model
provides an economic explanation of this group cohesion e¤ect: if the inter-
group conict becomes more decisive, or more is at stake in this conict, then
intra-group rent-seeking declines. Moreover, there is also a reversed group
cohesion e¤ect: if the intra-group contest becomes less decisive, or contrac-
tual incompleteness problems within groups less severe, then appropriative
activities in the inter-group contest increase.
In addition, my paper has normative implications concerning the optimal
design of organizations. In this respect, it is related to a series of papers
by Karl Wärneryd and coauthors. They point out that, while traditionally
it has been thought that rent-seeking activities will increase if an organi-
zation acquires more layers in a hierarchy, such multitiered structures can
actually reduce the costs of appropriative activities. For example, Wärn-
eryd claims that the institutional framework of federalism, such as that
of the EU may be seen as an e¢ cient response (...) to rent-seeking activi-
ties, since it lowers the dead weight losses from such activities(Wärneryd
1998, 436). Other applications include the allocation of free cash ow inside
organizations (Inderst, Müller and Wärneryd 2002), and distributional con-
ict between shareholders of corporations (Müller and Wärneryd 2001). The
analysis in these papers rests on three key assumptions. First, it is assumed
that there is a temporal order in which the contests take place: the inter-
group contest is fought rst, and only when it is resolved, do the intra-group
contests begin.2 Here, while deciding how much to spend on the contest
between groups, an individual will anticipate that if his group gets a bigger
share, his fellow group members will ght harder in the following intra-group
contest. This dampens incentives to engage into appropriative activities be-
tween groups in the rst stage. This is an important reason behind the result
of Wärneryd. In many real world examples, however, it seems as natural to
assume that the distributional conicts take place simultaneously. I study
this case. Then the e¤ect described above is not present, and this changes
the results. Second, Wärneryd models the contests in a way which follows
the literature on rent-seeking started by Tullock (1980): he uses a partial
equilibrium approach where the size of the contested rent is exogenous, and
2There are several other papers that study this kind of two stage contest game. The
earliest paper I am aware of is Katz and Tokatlidu (1996). Stein and Rapoport (2004) study
asymmetries and the reversed order of timing where the intra-group contest comes rst and
the inter-group contest second. Konrad (2004) considers a perfectly discriminating contest
and heterogeneous contestants. Garnkel (2004) explores the endogenous formation of
groups when there is conict both within and between groups. However, none of these
papers studies simultaneous inter- and intra-group conicts.
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does not depend on the amount of rent-seeking. This is realistic in some
contexts, but less so in others, where the allocation decision of the play-
ers are likely to have a discernible impact on the size of the contested rent.
Hence a general equilibrium approach, in the spirit of the conict models of
Hirshleifer (1988, 2001) and Skaperdas (1992) might be appropriate, since
in these models output is endogenous. Wärneryd himself pointed out that
explicitly modelling the trade-o¤ between production and appropriation is
an fruitful direction for further research (1998, p. 448; see Neary 1997 for a
comparison of rent-seeking and conict models). Third, Wärneryd assumes
that the technology of conict is the same in the intra-group contest as in
the inter-group contests. He relies on axiomatic foundations of contest tech-
nologies given by Skaperdas (1996), which can be generalized for inter-group
contests. However, the axioms pin down the functional form of the contest
success functions only up to a parameter, known as the decisiveness of the
contest, which is a major inuence on the marginal benets of rent-seeking
activities. As argued above, since inter- and intra-group contests are often
fought with di¤erent weapons, they may di¤er in their decisiveness. More-
over, the contractual problems that lead to rent-seeking activities might be
more or less severe within groups than between groups.
I study the trade o¤ between production and appropriation in a general
equilibrium conict model, where there are simultaneous inter- and intra-
group conicts, taking into account possible di¤erences in the technology of
conict. For comparison I also study a partial equilibrium rent-seeking model
(with simultaneous inter- and intra-group contests and possibly di¤erent con-
test technologies).3 My normative ndings are as follows. First, consider the
optimal number of groups for a given number of players. Whether splitting
up individuals into (more) groups leads to more or less rent-seeking depends
on the di¤erence between the nature of the inter-group conict and that of
the inter-group conict. If these conicts are equally decisive, and the con-
tractual problems are equally severe, the amount of rent-seeking does not
depend on the number of groups. If the conict is more decisive between the
groups than within groups, and if the degree of contractual incompleteness
is higher between the groups than within groups, then a at structure where
all individuals belong to one group is optimal. And vice versa: if the intra-
group conict is sharper, then one should split up the individuals in as many
groups as possible. These ndings contrast starkly with the results in the
3In addition to the papers discussed above, this is also related to Nitzan (1991), who
studied rent-seeking between groups. The main di¤erence is that in Nitzan (1991) there is
no intra-group rent-seeking and the distribution of rents both within groups and between
groups depends on the inter -group rent-seeking e¤orts. For an excellent survey of rent-
seeking theory, see Nitzan (1994).
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literature discussed above. The di¤erence is due to the di¤erent assumption
on the timing of the conicts. Thus, these results show the importance of the
simultaneity assumption. Second, I show that there is an optimal size of the
organization which is determined by a trade-o¤ between increasing returns
to scale in production on the one hand, and increasing costs of conict on
the other.
The paper proceeds as follows. The model of simultaneous inter- and
intra-group conicts is laid out in section 2. Section 3 derives the basic
predictions of the model. Section 4 considers the question of optimal design.
Section 5 discusses extensions of the basic model to di¤erent production
technologies, conict technologies, and unequal group size. Section 6 gives
a comparison with a partial equilibrium rent-seeking model of simultaneous
inter- and intra-group conicts. Section 7 concludes.
2 The model
There are n identical individuals and G groups of equal size m = n=G. Each
individual is endowed with one unit of time and has three choice variables:
productive e¤ort eig; intra-group rent-seeking e¤ort xig; and inter-group rent-
seeking e¤ort yig: The rst subscript refers to the individual, the second to
the group he is a member of. The budget constraints are given by
eig + xig + yig = 1
for all i = 1; :::;m and all g = 1; ::; G:
For simplicity, I assume that output is given by the constant elasticity
production function
q =
 
GX
g=1
mX
i=1
eig
!h
: (1)
The parameter h > 0 determines returns to scale: if h > 1 we have increasing
returns to scale, if h = 1 constant, and if h < 1 decreasing returns to scale.
Equation (1) assumes that the complementarities within the organizations
are independent of the number of groups. This seems a natural benchmark
for studying the e¤ects of the number and size of groups from a rent-seeking
perspective.
The output is distributed among the groups. Denote the share that goes
to group g by pg: Hence group g gets pgq: This amount is distributed within
the group; player i gets the share rig: Thus the payo¤ of player i in group g
is
uig = pgrigq:
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Let us rst turn to the allocation of output within groups. It depends on
the intra-group rent-seeking activities. I will assume that
rig =
(

xaigP
j x
a
jg
+ (1  ) 1
m
; if
P
j x
a
jg > 0;
1
m
; if
P
j x
a
jg = 0:
(2)
Here,  2 [0; 1] is a measure of the contractual incompleteness within groups:
one part (1  ) of the groups share is allocated by a simple equal division
rule, and the other part () is allocated according to the intra-group rent-
seeking activities.
The specic functional form of the intra-group contest success function,
xaigP
j x
a
jg
;
has been used widely in the literature. There is an axiomatic foundation
by Skaperdas (1996). The parameter a describes the decisiveness of the
intra-group contest. If a ! 0; rent-seeking e¤ort has little inuence on the
division of the gains, whereas if a!1; tiny di¤erences in rent-seeking e¤ort
are decisive.
The allocation of output to groups depends on the inter-group rent-
seeking e¤orts. Group k gets the fraction
pk =
8><>:

(
P
j yjk)
bP
g(
P
j yjg)
b + (1  ) 1G ; if
P
g
P
j yjg
b
> 0;
1
G
; if
P
g
P
j yjg
b
= 0;
(3)
of the output. Here  2 [0; 1] is a parameter that measures how important
rent-seeking activities are in the inter-group contest. It measures the con-
tractual incompleteness between the groups. As in the intra-group contest, in
the inter-group contest only a part () is allocated according to rent-seeking
activities. Contractual incompleteness problems may be more or less severe
between groups than within groups. Hence  may be bigger or smaller than
:
The specic functional form of the inter-group contest success function,P
j yjk
b
P
g
P
j yjg
b
can be given an axiomatic foundation in close analogy to Skaperdas (1996)
foundation of intra-group contest success function, with the additional as-
sumption that rent-seeking e¤orts of a group are aggregated e¢ ciently and
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hence the contest success function depends only on the sum of the rent seek-
ing e¤orts.4 Here, the parameter b describes the decisiveness of the contest
between the groups. It may, or may not, be equal to the decisiveness of the
contest within the groups a. Since contests between groups are usually fought
with instruments di¤erent from those in contests between groups, they might
well have a di¤erent decisiveness.5
Note that two pairs of parameters describe the di¤erent layers of conict:
the decisiveness parameters a and b; and the parameters  and  that indicate
the importance of rent-seeking. I will assume that 0 < a  1 and 0 < b  1:
The assumption that a and b are positive means that the a players share
of the output increases in his rent-seeking activities. The upper bounds are
imposed to make the model tractable. As we will see, they are su¢ cient to
make all the optimization problems well behaved. Let me point out that,
if  =  = 1; no upper bounds on a and b are necessary. In this case one
can easily nd the equilibria even if a ! 1 and b ! 1 (this is the case of
discontinuous contest success functions, as in all pay auctions) (see section
5.2).
3 The group cohesion e¤ect
Using the budget constraints to express uik as a function of rent-seeking
e¤orts alone, we can write
uik = pkrik
 X
g
X
j
(1  xjg   yjg)
!h
: (4)
I show in appendix A1 that the log of uik is strictly concave in (xik; yik) :
Hence any critical point of lnuik is a strict global maximum. Since the log
is a strictly monotone function, it follows that any critical point of uik is a
strict global maximum, too. This means that we can solve the maximization
problem of an individual by looking at the rst order conditions. We will
ignore the non-negativity constraints temporarily, and check afterwards that
all the constraints hold.
Di¤erentiating equation (4) with respect to yik and setting the result equal
4See Münster (2005) for an axiomatization of group contest success functions.
5To give an analogy, consider chess and backgammon. These games are certainly
governed by di¤erent contest success functions, since luck plays a much more important
role in backgammon.
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to zero, we get
@pk
@yik
q = pkh
 X
g
X
j
(1  xjg   yjg)
!h 1
: (5)
In a symmetric equilibrium, all individuals choose the same allocation of their
budget: yig = y and xig = x for all i and g: Conjecturing that a symmetric
equilibrium exists, we get
(G  1) bm (1  x  y) = (my)h
Di¤erentiating equation (4) with respect to xik; and setting the result equal
to zero yields
@rik
@xik
q = rikh
 X
g
X
j
(1  xjg   yjg)
!h 1
: (6)
In a symmetric equilibrium,
(m  1) aG (1  x  y) = xh
Solving, we nally get (recall n = mG)
y =
b (G  1)
a (n G) + b (G  1) + h (7)
and
x =
a (n G)
a (n G) + b (G  1) + h: (8)
Note that 0 < x < 1 and 0 < y < 1: Productive e¤ort per person equals
e = 1  x  y = h
a (n G) + b (G  1) + h > 0: (9)
This is positive, therefore no constraint is violated. We can conclude that a
symmetric equilibrium does in fact exist.
However, the equilibrium is not unique. The rst order conditions pin
down only the total amount of inter-group rent-seeking done by a group,
and the total amount of productive e¤ort put in by the groups members.
How the members of the group coordinate in supplying productive and inter-
group rent-seeking e¤ort is not determined. The following lemma sums up
this discussion.
7
Lemma 1 There is a continuum of equilibria, where
a) all contestants choose the same intra-group rent-seeking e¤ort x given in
equation (8),
b) for all groups g; the total amount of inter-group rent-seeking chosen by gs
members equals X
i
yig = my (10)
where y is given in equation (7),
c) for all groups g; the total amount of productive e¤ort of the members of
group g equals X
i
eig = me; (11)
where e is given in equation (9),
d) the utility of an individual is
u =
1
n

n
h
a (n G) + b (G  1) + h
h
: (12)
Proof. Parts a, b, and c follow from the discussion above; part d follows
by inserting equilibrium choices into the utility function.
In these equilibria, the average amount of inter-group rent-seeking is y
given in equations (7) above. Similarly, e given in equation (9) is the av-
erage amount of productive e¤ort. We will make use of this in some of the
comparative static exercises below.
What determines the allocation of e¤ort to production and inter- and
intra-group rent-seeking? The following proposition studies the inuence of
the technology of conict, contractual incompleteness, and the production
technology.
Proposition 1 a) If the contest between the groups becomes more decisive
(i.e. b increases) and/or contractual incompleteness between groups becomes
more serious (i.e.  increases), then rent-seeking within groups and produc-
tive e¤ort decline, while inter-group rent-seeking increases.
b) If the intra-group contests become more decisive (i.e. a increases) and/or
contractual incompleteness within groups becomes more serious (i.e.  in-
creases), then rent-seeking between groups and productive e¤ort decline, while
intra-group rent-seeking increases.
c) An increase in the returns to scale in production h increases productive
e¤ort, and decreases rent-seeking both within and between groups.
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Proof. a) From equations (7)- (11) it is obvious that as b increases, x
and
P
i eig decrease, while
P
i yig increases.
b) Again from equations (7)- (11), if a increases,
P
i yig and
P
i eig
decrease, while x increases.
c) Di¤erentiate equations (7)- (11) to get
@x
@h
=   a (n G)
(a (n G) + b (G  1) + h)2 < 0;
@
@h
 X
i
yig
!
=  m b (G  1)
(a (n G) + b (G  1) + h)2 < 0;
@
@h
 X
i
eig
!
= m
a (n G) + (G  1) b
(a (n G) + b (G  1) + h)2 > 0:
Part a) says that an increase in the contractual incompleteness between
groups, or an increase in the decisiveness of the inter-group contest, leads
to less intra-group rent-seeking. This is reminiscent of the group cohesion
e¤ectdocumented in psychology and anthropology: increased competition
between groups leads to more cohesion within the groups. In the model,
we can interpret more competition between groups as an increase in  and/
or ; and more cohesion as lower x: In the model a group cohesion e¤ect
arises by individual, noncooperative utility maximization, without any need
for centralized leadership of the group. An increase in  means that more is
at stake in the conict between groups, and leads to less intra-group hostility.
Further, an increase in b means that the inter-group contest gets more deci-
sive, and leads to less intra-group hostility, too. The intuition is simply that
the marginal benet of inter-group rent-seeking activities is proportional to
b and : Hence an increase in b and  makes more inter-group rent-seeking
mor attractive compared to intra-group rent-seeking and production.
Sometimes a reverse of the group cohesion e¤ect is postulated as well:
heightened in-group cohesion is itself a condition for out-group hostility
(Fisher 1990, p. 68).6 As part b) of the proposition shows, this e¤ect holds
in the model studied here, too. A lower decisiveness a of the intra-group
contest success technology leads to more inter-group conict. Also, a decrease
in  - which means that the group is more egalitarianand the distribution
within the group is less dependent on rent-seeking - leads to more conict
between groups.
6However, empirically the existence of such an e¤ect is much more in doubt than the
original cohesion e¤ect, see Fisher (1990).
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Part c) of proposition 1 says that an increase in h leads to more productive
e¤ort, and less rent-seeking. This is due to the fact that the marginal benet
of working productively is proportional to h: Usually, an increase in h will
increase utility. Utility can decline only if the sum of all productive e¤orts
is smaller than one. In this range, an increase in h corresponds to a decrease
in productivity, and may lead to lower equilibrium utility.
4 The optimal number and size of the groups
The next exercise is to describe the inuence of the number and size of the
groups on equilibrium behavior.
Proposition 2 a) For a given number of individuals n; productive e¤ort
increases in the number of groups G if, and only if, b < a: Intra-group rent-
seeking e¤ort x declines in G, and average inter-group rent-seeking e¤ort y
increases.
b) Increasing the size m of the groups while holding constant their number G
results in an unambiguous decrease in average productive e¤ort and average
inter-group rent-seeking, while it increases intra-group rent-seeking.
c) Increasing the number of groups G while holding constant the size m of
the groups leads to a decline in productive e¤ort and an increase in inter-
group rent-seeking. The e¤ect on the intra-group conict depends on the
parameters: it increases if, and only if, h > b:
Proof. a) By di¤erentiating equation (9) we nd that
@e
@G
jn=const = h a   b
(a (n G) + b (G  1) + h)2
8<:
>
=
<
9=; 0
if, and only if,
a
8<:
>
=
<
9=; b:
Further, we get
@x
@G
jn=const =  a h+ (n  1) b
(a (n G) + b (G  1) + h)2 < 0;
@y
@G
jn=const = b a (n  1) + h
(a (n G) + b (G  1) + h)2 > 0:
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b) Use n = Gm to eliminate n in equations (9), (8), and (7):
e =
h
aG (m  1) + b (G  1) + h
x =
aG (m  1)
aG (m  1) + b (G  1) + h
y =
b (G  1)
aG (m  1) + b (G  1) + h
Obviously, e and y decrease in m for a given G; whereas x increases.
c) Suppose G increases while m is constant. Clearly, e goes down, while
y goes up. Further,
@x
@G
jm=const: = (m  1) a h  b
(aG (m  1) + b (G  1) + h)2 ;
hence x increases if, and only if, h > b:
Now we can turn to the normative implications of the model. The aim is
to understand what a rent-seeking perspective can contribute to the question
of an optimal design of an organization that is ridden by simultaneous inter-
and intra-group conict. Especially, what are the optimal number and size
of groups? That is, which m and G maximize equilibrium utility as given in
equation (12) above?
As noted in the introduction, there is a discussion in the literature on
the e¤ect of additional levels of hierarchy in an organization on rent-seeking
activities. The message of the present model is that the di¤erent technolo-
gies of conict, and the amount of contractual incompleteness, are of the
paramount importance.
Proposition 3 If a < b, then a at structure where all individuals belong
to the same group is optimal. On the other hand, if a > b, then one should
split the individuals up in as many groups as possible.
Proof. This maximizes productive e¤ort by proposition 2 above. Output
depends by assumption only on the sum of the individual productive e¤orts,
and not directly on the number of groups. Each individual gets the share
1=n of the output. Hence the result follows.
Having studied the optimal number of groups, I turn now to the question
of optimal group size. Consider rst the case that a < b: Here, we have
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seen that having only one group is optimal. Setting G = 1 in equation (12)
we get
u =
1
n

n
h
a (n  1) + h
h
:
Maximizing this over n (ignoring integer constraints for convenience) leads
to an optimal size of the organization which is given by
n ja<b = 1 + hh  1  a
a
:
Several features are worth noting. First, the production technology must
exhibit su¢ ciently increasing returns to scale for it to be worthwhile forming
a partnership. If h  1 + a; the optimal organization consists of only
one person. Second, the optimal size is increasing in returns to scale in
production h; decreasing in the decisiveness of the contest a; and decreasing
in the severity of contractual incompleteness :
We have here a trade of between increasing returns and rent-seeking. If
h > 1 production exhibits increasing returns to scale. Therefore it would be
optimal to have as many people as possible working together, if one could
distribute the gains without rent-seeking activities (formally, as a ! 0;
n ! 1): But if the output is distributed by rent-seeking, the optimal size
of the partnership is limited by the increasing rent-seeking cost. An increase
in the number of individuals leads to unambiguously lower productive e¤ort
per person.
A similar analysis applies for the case a > b: Here, it is optimal to have
G = n; and the optimal size of the organization is
n ja>b = 1 + hh  1  b
b
:
In the remaining case where a = b; the number of groups plays no role
for welfare, and the optimal size of the organization is given by either of the
equations above. The following proposition sums up the ndings concerning
the optimal size of the organization.
Proposition 4 There exists an optimal size of the organization which is
determined by a trade o¤ between increasing returns to scale in production
on the one hand and increasing costs of conict on the other. The optimal size
increases in the returns-to-scale parameter h: It decreases in the decisiveness
of the contest and in the amount of contractual incompleteness.
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5 Extensions: production technology, contest
technology, unequal group size, and leisure
5.1 A more general production technology
As a robustness check I generalize the model by considering a more general
production function
q = f
 
nX
i=1
ei
!
: (13)
I assume that f is strictly increasing and twice di¤erentiable. In addition, I
will assume that the function f is not too convex. A su¢ cient condition is
that the log of f be concave. Given this assumption, the objective functions
of the players are log-concave, and we can rely on rst order conditions in
order to characterize equilibria.
After imposing symmetry the rst order conditions boil down to
my = b
(G  1)
G
f (n (1  x  y))
f 0 (n (1  x  y)) (14)
and
x = a
m  1
m
f (n (1  x  y))
f 0 (n (1  x  y)) (15)
Since f is log-concave by assumption, the right hand sides of the previous
equations are decreasing in x and y: Hence the equations determine x and y
uniquely.
The following proposition 1* generalizes proposition 1.
Proposition 1* Suppose that output is given in equation (13) and f is
log-concave.
a) If the contest between the groups becomes more decisive (i.e. b in-
creases) and/or contractual incompleteness between groups becomes more se-
rious (i.e.  increases), then rent-seeking within groups x and productive
e¤ort e decline, while inter-group rent-seeking y increases.
b) If the intra-group contests become more decisive (i.e. a increases)
and/or contractual incompleteness within groups becomes more serious (i.e.
 increases), then rent-seeking between groups y and productive e¤ort e
decline, while intra-group rent-seeking x increases.
Proof. As argued above, after imposing symmetry the rst order condi-
tions imply equations (14) and (15). Dene
 (z) :=
f (z)
f 0 (z)
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Note that  (z) > 0; and 0 (z) > 0 since f is assumed to be log-concave.
Total di¤erentiation of equations (14) and (15) leads to
M

dy
dx

= N
0BB@
a
b


1CCA
where
M =

m+ b (G 1)
G
n0 b (G 1)
G
n0
am 1
m
n0 1 + am 1
m
n0

;
and
N =

0  (G 1)
G
 0 b (G 1)
G

m 1
m
 0 am 1
m
 0

(For brevity, I omit the arguments of the functions  and 0).
The determinant of the matrix M equals
jM j = mG+ 
0anG (m  1) + bn0 (G  1)
G
> 0
Now we can prove part a).
dx
db
=   1jM ja
m  1
m
n0
(G  1)
G
 < 0:
Moreover,
dy
db
=
1
jM j
(G  1)
G


1 + a
m  1
m
n0

> 0:
Finally,
de
db
=  

dx
db
+
dy
db

=
=   1jM j
(G  1)
G
 < 0:
Similarly,
dx
d
=   1jM ja
m  1
m
n0b
(G  1)
G
 < 0;
dy
d
=
1
jM jb
(G  1)
G


1 + a
m  1
m
n0

> 0;
de
d
=   1jM jb
(G  1)
G
 < 0:
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Part b).
dx
da
=
1
jM j

m+ b
(G  1)
G
n0


m  1
m
 > 0;
dy
da
=   1jM jb
G  1
G
n0
m  1
m
 < 0;
de
da
=   1jM j (m  1) < 0:
Similarly,
dx
d
=
1
jM j

m+ b
(G  1)
G
n0

a
m  1
m
 > 0;
dy
d
=   1jM jb
G  1
G
n0a
m  1
m
 < 0;
de
d
=   1jM ja (m  1) < 0:
Thus, the comparative statics given in proposition 1 above holds true also
with the more general production technology considered here, except part c
concerning the productivity parameter h; which does not appear in (13). In
particular, both the group cohesion e¤ect and the reversed group cohesion
e¤ect still hold.
Summing over equations (14) and (15), it follows that the total amount
of rent-seeking
R := n (y + x)
equals (use (m  1) =m = (n G) =n)
R = ((G  1) (b  a) + a (n  1)) f (n R)
f 0 (n R) (16)
As above, the total amount of rent-seeking is increasing in the number of
groups if, and only if, b > a: This can be seen easily from equation (16).
Since f is by assumption log-concave, the right hand side is decreasing in R:
Suppose b > a; and G increases. Then R has to increase in order that (16)
holds. Hence it is clear that the ndings are not an artifact of the production
function (1) considered above.
15
5.2 A very decisive contest technology
So far, the analysis was based on the assumption that a  1 and b  1:
That is, the decisiveness of the contest success functions was assumed to
be bounded from above. Here I add some brief considerations on the case
where the contest technologies are very decisive. Then it is no longer clear
whether the rst order conditions in fact do describe equilibria. However,
the benchmark case where  =  = 1 turns out to be easy to solve. Here the
objective functions are log-concave for all a; b 2 (0;1) (see appendix). Hence
the analysis above holds without alteration for all a; b 2 (0;1) : We can use
this case to study a situation where the environment is very conictual:
the whole output is distributed according to the appropriative activities,
and the contests are very decisive. For example, it is interesting to note
what happens in the limiting case a = b = 1: Here the contest success
functions are discontinuous: the group that puts in the most inter-group
rent-seeking e¤ort gets the whole output, and, within groups, the player who
chooses the highest intra-group e¤ort gets everything (in case of a tie the
groups or persons involved share equally). There is an equilibrium where
all players devote all their energy to inter-group rent-seeking (yig = 1): In
this equilibrium, output and utility equals zero. No one has an incentive to
deviate, since then the inter-group rent-seeking e¤orts of his group would be
smaller than those of the other groups, and thus his group will get nothing.
Similarly, there is an equilibrium where all devote their energy solely to intra-
group rent-seeking (xig = 1):
5.3 Unequal group size
When groups are of equal size, equilibrium utility is increasing in the number
of groups if, and only if, a > b: However, when the groups are of unequal
size, utility of the individuals also depends on the size of the groups. For
simplicity, I will concentrate on the case of G = 2 groups of di¤erent size.
Denote the number of individuals in group g by mg: The objective function
of player i = 1; :::;mg in group g = 1; 2 can be written as
uig = pgrig
 
2X
k=1
mkX
j=1
(1  xjk   yjk)
!h
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where
pg = 
 Pmg
j=1 yjg
bPm1
j=1 yj1
b
+
Pm2
j=1 yj2
b + (1  )2 ;
rig = 
xaigPmg
j=1 x
a
jg
+
(1  )
mg
Dene an interior equilibrium as an equilibrium where all decision vari-
ables are positive. The following remark assumes an interior equilibrium and
derives its properties; existence will be studied below.
Remark 1 In an interior equilibrium, both groups get the same share of the
output
p1 = p2 =
1
2
;
and the share of an individual i = 1; :::;mg in group g = 1; 2 equals
pgrig =
1
2mg
:
Proof. In an interior equilibrium the rst order condition @uig
@yig
= 0 has
to hold for g = 1; 2 and i = 1; :::;mg: For group 1 this is

b
Pm1
j=1 yj1
b 1 Pm2
j=1 yj2
b
Pm1
j=1 yj1
b
+
Pm2
j=1 yj2
b2
 X
g
X
j
(1  xjg   yjg)
!
=
0B@
Pm1
j=1 yj1
b
Pm1
j=1 yj1
b
+
Pm2
j=1 yj2
b + (1  )2
1CAh (17)
Similarly, for group 2

b
Pm2
j=1 yj2
b 1 Pm1
j=1 yj1
b
Pm1
j=1 yj1
b
+
Pm2
j=1 yj2
b2
 X
g
X
j
(1  xjg   yjg)
!
=
0B@
Pm2
j=1 yj2
b
Pm1
j=1 yj1
b
+
Pm2
j=1 yj2
b + (1  )2
1CAh (18)
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Dividing the equations, we get
Pm2
j=1 yj2Pm1
j=1 yj1
=

(
Pm1
j=1 yj1)
b
(
Pm1
j=1 yj1)
b
+(
Pm2
j=1 yj2)
b +
(1 )
2

(
Pm2
j=1 yj2)
b
(
Pm1
j=1 yj1)
b
+(
Pm2
j=1 yj2)
b +
(1 )
2
:
This is satised if and only if
Pm1
j=1 yj1 =
Pm2
j=1 yj2 since the left hand side
is increasing in
Pm2
j=1 yj2; while the right hand side is decreasing in
Pm2
j=1 yj2:
This shows that p1 = p2 = 1=2:
The result that rig = 1=mg can be derived in the same way from the rst
order condition @uig
@xig
= 0: I write it our for players 1 and 2 in group g; a
similar argument applies to the other players. For player 1; we have

axa 11g
P
j 6=1 x
a
jgP
j x
a
jg
2
 X
g
X
j
(1  xjg   yjg)
!
=
 

xa1gP
j x
a
jg
+
1  
m1
!
h (19)
For player 2;

axa 12g
P
j 6=2 x
a
jgP
j x
a
jg
2
 X
g
X
j
(1  xjg   yjg)
!
=
 

xa2gP
j x
a
jg
+
1  
m1
!
h
Divide the last two equations to get
xa 11g
P
j 6=1 x
a
jg
xa 12g
P
j 6=2 x
a
jg
=


xa1gP
j x
a
jg
+ 1 
m1



xa2gP
j x
a
jg
+ 1 
m1

The left hand side is decreasing in x1g; while the right hand side is increasing.
Thus, the equation holds if and only if x1g = x2g:
This result is related to the paradox of power studied by Hirshleifer (1992,
reprinted in 2001, chapter 3). Hirshleifer studies a conict between two
players who are endowed with a di¤erent amount of resources. He shows
that the richer player does not necessarily get a higher equilibrium utility.
Similarly, in the case of conict between two groups, the larger group does
not get a higher share of total output.
In contrast to the case of equal group size, an interior equilibrium where
all the choice variables are positive does not always exist. However, one
can show that a symmetric interior equilibrium exists if the technology is
su¢ ciently productive (h su¢ ciently large). Here I will focus on symmetric
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interior equilibria, where xig = xg and yig = yg for all i = 1; :::;mg in group
g = 1; 2:
Impose symmetry on equation (17) and use m1y1 = m2y2 from remark 1
to get
m1y1 = m2y2 =
1
2
b
n m1x1  m2x2
b+ h
: (20)
Imposing symmetry on (19) gives us for group one

a (m1   1)
m1
(n m1 (x1 + y1) m2 (x2 + y2)) = hx1 (21)
Similarly, for group 2

a (m2   1)
m2
(n m1 (x1 + y1) m2 (x2 + y2)) = hx2 (22)
Solving equations (20), (21), and (22) we nd
xg =
(mg   1)
mg
an
(a (n  2) + b+ h) > 0; (23)
yg =
n
2mg
b
a (n  2) + b+ h > 0: (24)
Using the budget constraint, we get
eg =
(n  2mg) (2a  b) + 2mgh
2mg (a (n  2) + b+ h) (25)
If the technology is su¢ ciently productive, then eg > 0 for both groups
and no constraints are violated; hence equations (23), (24) and (25) describe
a symmetric interior equilibrium. The following remark makes this precise.
Remark 2 A symmetric interior equilibrium exists if and only if
h 

1  n
2mg

(2a  b) for g = 1; 2: (26)
In the case of equal group size, condition (26) holds trivially since h 
0: An easy example with unequal group size where existence is ensured is
a = b = h = 1: Here, eg = yig = 1= (2mg) ; xg = (mg   1) =mg: However,
with unequal group size, there is no symmetric interior equilibrium if h is too
small: if h ! 0; sgn (eg) = sgn ((n  2mg) (2a  b)) ; but this is negative
for at least one group. For the rest of this section, I will assume that (26)
holds.
Finally, we can turn to welfare considerations.
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Remark 3 If a = b; total output is the same when there are two groups
and when there is a unied organization (only one group). The members of
the smaller group prefer the situation with two groups, but members of the
bigger group would rather have a unied organization.
Proof. With two groups, output equals
qII = (m1e1 +m2e2)
h =

nh
a (n  1) + b  a+ h
h
With one group (see lemma 1 in the main text), output equals
qI =

nh
a (n  1) + h
h
Clearly, qI > (=; <) qII if and only if b > (=; <) a:
If a = b; equilibrium utility with two groups equals
uIIig =
1
2mg

nh
a (n  1) + h
h
:
Equilibrium utility with one group equals
uIig =
1
n

nh
a (n  1) + h
h
:
Obviously, uIIig >
I
ig if and only if mg <
n
2
:
To compare the two group case with a situation where all individuals
belong to only one group, remark 3 considers the case where a = b: Here,
output is the same irrespective of the number of groups. But its allocation
to the individuals di¤ers. With only one group, each individual gets the
share 1=n. Hence, members of the smaller group prefer the situation with
two groups, but members of the bigger group would rather have a unied
organization. If a 6= b; we have the additional e¤ect that total output is
di¤erent between the two structures.
5.4 Leisure as a further choice variable
In this section I introduce a further choice variable, called leisure. The
purpose is to shed additional light on the group cohesion e¤ect. We will
see that if leisure has constant marginal utility, then, assuming intererior
equilibria, there is no group cohesion e¤ect in the model. The reason behind
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this is that an increase in b leads only to less leisure in equilibrium, but does
not change the incentives to engage in inter-group rent-seeking or production.
The budget constraint is now given by
1 = xig + yig + eig + lig
where lig is the amount of leisure consumed by player i in group g: In addition,
I assume that leisure gives some utility v (lig) with v0 > 0 and v00 < 0; which
enters the objective function linearly and is not subject to appropriation by
rent-seeking. Thus,
uig = pgrigq + v (lig)
I will assume that symmetric interior equilibria exist. This assumption im-
plicitly puts some restrictions on the parameters of the model. Set up the
Lagrangian
Lig (xig; yig; eig; lig) = pgrigq + v (lig) +  (1  xig   yig   eig   lig)
The rst order conditions are
@Lig
@xig
= pg
@rig
@xig
q    = 0;
@Lig
@yig
=
@pg
@yig
rigq    = 0;
@Lig
@eig
= pgrig
@q
@eig
   = 0;
@Lig
@lig
= v0 (lig)   = 0 (27)
The rst three lines can be written as
pga
xa 1ig
P
j 6=i x
a
jg

P
j x
a
jg
2 q = 
b
P
j yjg
b 1P
k 6=g
P
j yjk
b
P
k
P
j yjk
b2 rigq = 
pgrigh
 X
k
X
j
ejk
!h 1
= 
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Imposing symmetry, this implies
1
G
a
1
x
m  1
m2
q =  (28)
b
1
my
G  1
G2
1
m
q =  (29)
1
n
h (ne)h 1 =  (30)
The special case where v (l) is a linear function, v (l) = kl for some
constant k; is a particularly interesting benchmark. Here, the shadow value
 of the resource is equal to k and thus constant (see equation (27)). Thus,
equation (30) denes a unique value of the equilibrium e¤ort as
e =
1
n

kn
h
 1
h 1
:
Thus, total output is
q =

kn
h
 h
h 1
:
Plug this in equations (28) and (29) to nd that
x =
1
k
1
G
a
m  1
m2

kn
h
 h
h 1
y =
1
k
b
1
my
G  1
G2
1
m

kn
h
 h
h 1
Finally, the budget constraint determines the equilibrium value of leisure.
Note that here, x does not depend on b; and y does not depend on a:
Thus, the group cohesion e¤ect does not hold in this model. An increase in
b increases y, but only at the expense of leisure. Production and inter-group
rent-seeking stay constant.
However, this nding depends critically on the assumption that v00 (l) = 0:
Suppose to the contrary that v00 < 0: Again, an increase in b will increase y
and decrease l: But with v00 < 0 this implies that  is now larger, and thus x
and e will decrease, too.
6 Comparison with a rent-seeking model
Since most of the literature on inter- and intra-group conict deals with rent-
seeking models, it is interesting to compare the model derived above with a
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rent-seeking model. Consider the following rent-seeking model. As above,
there are n individuals in G groups of equal size m = G=n: They compete
over some exogenously given prize of value v: Each individual simultaneously
chooses some inter-group rent-seeking e¤ort yig and some intra-group rent-
seeking e¤ort xig: There are no budget constraints. Rather, the costs of the
rent-seeking activities are given by a cost function c (xig; yig) : I assume that
c (xig; yig) is strictly increasing and convex.
The payo¤ of individual i in group g is
vig = pgrigv   xig   yig
where rig and pg are as given in equations (2) and (3) above.
There are two di¤erences between the conict model considered above
and this rent-seeking model. First, the conict model is a general equilibrium
model, whereas the rent-seeking model assumes that the size of the contested
rent is constant and thus is a partial equilibrium model. Second, the costs of
the rent-seeking activities are modelled in a di¤erent way. In the rent-seeking
model the cost are captured by a cost function; in the conict model the cost
are the opportunity cost of foregone production. Which of the two types of
models is more appropriate depends on the application one has in mind (see
Neary 1997 for a discussion).
For simplicity, I will only consider the case where a symmetric equilib-
rium exists. Contrary to the conict model above, symmetric equilibria do
not always exist. This follows from Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (1994)
who show this for the case of only one group. Mathematically, the di¤erence
is due to the fact that lnuig is concave and hence a critical point of uig is
a maximum, whereas critical points of vig are not always maxima. Implic-
itly, the assumption of a symmetric equilibrium imposes restrictions on the
parameters of the model.7
6.1 Linear cost function
The case of a linear cost function is of special interest, because it has been
used in most of the rent-seeking literature:
c (xig; yig) = xig + yig:
Note that with the linear cost function the marginal costs of the two rent
seeking activities are constant. This is an important di¤erence to the conict
7For example, suppose a = b = 1 and G = 2: I show in appendix A3 that a symmetric
equilibrium exists if n = 4; but no symmetric equilibrium exists if n = 10.
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model above, where the costs are the opportunity costs of foregone produc-
tion, and hence the marginal costs are not constant.
In a symmetric equilibrium, it is clear that x and y must be positive.
Hence the derivative of vig with respect to xig and yig has to be zero. Using
symmetry, these rst order conditions boil down to
x =
(m  1)
m2
a
G
v =
(n G) a
n2
v;
y =
(G  1)
G2
b
m2
v =
(G  1) b
n2
v:
These equations show that neither the group cohesion e¤ect, nor its con-
verse holds: x is independent of b and ; and y is independent of a and : As
we will see in the next subsection, this is due to the assumption that the mar-
ginal costs of x are independent of y; and vice versa the marginal cost of y are
independent of x: If we would consider a cost function with @
2
@x@y
c (x; y) > 0
instead, there would be a group cohesion e¤ect in the rent seeking model as
well. The case of a linear cost function where @
2
@x@y
c (x; y) = 0 corresponds to
the case of the conict model with constant marginal utility of leisure.
The e¤ect of dividing contestants into subgroups is qualitatively similar
in the rent-seeking and the conict models. In the rent-seeking model with
a linear cost function, the total amount of rent-seeking equals
x+ y =
(n G) a + (G  1) b
n2
v:
Clearly, this is increasing in G if, and only if, a < b: Therefore, proposition
3 above holds in the rent-seeking model, too.
As noted in the introduction, Wärneryd (1998) argues that dividing the
contestants in groups leads to less rent-dissipation, although it induces an
additional layer of (inter-group) conict. The model studied here di¤ers from
Wärneryds in two respects. First, in Wärneryds model the contest between
groups takes place rst, and only when it is resolved do the contests within
groups start. Second, Wärneryd assumes that the contest technology is the
same in the intra- and inter-group contests. For a comparison, consider the
case where b = a: If inter- and intra-group conicts take place simultane-
ously, then total rent-seeking expenditure does not depend on G: Therefore,
it is mainly the sequential timing of choices that drives Wärneryds results.8
The intuition for this is clear. If the contests take place sequentially, an
8This corrects the claim that, in Wärneryds model, it is of no importance whether the
conicts take place simultaneously or sequentially (see Wärneryd 1998, p. 444 footnote 7,
Müller and Wärneryd 2001 p. 531, who attribute this claim to a referee).
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individual will reason as follows while deciding how much to spend on the
contest between groups: if my group gets a bigger share, my fellow group
members will ght harder in the following intra-group contest. This damp-
ens incentives for inter-group rent-seeking. However, this e¤ect is not present
in the case of simultaneous inter- and intra-group conicts, where, in a Nash
equilibrium, each player takes the actions of the other players as given.
6.2 Cross e¤ects in the cost function
The purpose of this subsection is to show that in the rent-seeking model
there is a group cohesion e¤ect if the cost function has a positive cross-partial
derivative:
@2
@x@y
c (x; y) > 0:
I study the case of an increasing and convex cost function c (x; y) : As above, I
assume existence of a symmetric equilibrium and derive its properties. Writ-
ing out the rst order conditions and imposing symmetry gives us
1
G

a (m  1)
m2x
v   cx (x; y) = 0;

b (G  1)
G2m2y
v   cy (x; y) = 0
where subscripts denote partial derivatives. Total di¤erentiation of the rst
order conditions gives us  Aa
x2
  cxx  cxy
 cxy  Bby2   cyy

dx
dy

=
  A 0
0  B

d (a)
d (b)

(31)
where
A =
1
G
(m  1)
m2
v > 0;
B =
(G  1)
G2m2
v > 0:
Let D denote the determinant of the matrix on the left hand side of (31), i.
e.
D =

Aa
x2
+ cxx

Bb
y2
+ cyy

  c2xy
where double subscripts denote second partial derivatives. Since we are by
assumption studying an equilibrium, the second order condition has to hold
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at (x; y) ; and thus D > 0: Using Cramers rule, we nd that
dx
d (a)
=
1
D

Bb
y2
+ cyy

> 0;
dy
d (b)
=
1
D

Aa
x2
+ cxx

> 0:
Moreover,
dy
d (a)
=
dx
d (b)
=
cxy
D
:
Thus, the group cohesion e¤ect and the reversed group cohesion e¤ect hold
in the rent seeking model if and only if the cost function has a positive cross
partial derivative cxy > 0:
7 Conclusion
This paper studied the trade o¤ between production and appropriation in
the presence of simultaneous inter- and intra-group conicts. It gave an
economic model of the group cohesion e¤ect: if the contest between groups
becomes more decisive, or the degree of contractual incompleteness between
groups increases, this leads to less conict within groups. Moreover, in the
model there is also an reversed group cohesion e¤ect: if the intra-group
contest becomes less decisive, or the degree of contractual incompleteness
within groups decreases, this leads to more inter-group conict.
The model has two normative implications. First, whether a multitiered
structure with several groups leads to less rent-seeking activities depends
on the decisiveness of the inter- and intra-group contest success functions,
and on the amount of contractual incompleteness within groups and between
groups. If the inter-group contest is less decisive than the intra-group contest,
and contractual problems are less severe between groups than within groups,
a multi-tiered structure is benecial - it leads to less rent-seeking and more
production. On the other hand, if the inter-group contest is more decisive,
and contractual problems are more severe between groups, a multi-tiered
structure leads to more rent-seeking.
Second, there is an optimal size of the organization which is determined by
a trade-o¤ between increasing returns to scale in production and increasing
costs of rent-seeking.
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A Appendix
A.1 Utility is log-concave if 0 < a  1 and 0 < b  1
From equation (4), we get
lnuik = ln
0B@
Pm
j=1 yjk
b
PG
g=1
Pn
j=1 yjg
b + (1  )G
1CA
| {z }
A(yik)
+
+ln
 

xaikP
j x
a
jk
+
(1  )
m
!
| {z }
B(xik)
+
+h ln
 X
g
X
j
(1  xjg   yjg)
!
| {z }
C(xik;yik)
:
We want to show that this is strictly concave in (xik; yik) :
Let us look at the terms in turn. For notational convenience, let
Pm
j 6=i yjk =:
Y and
PG
g 6=k
Pn
j=1 yjg
b
=: Z: Then
A (yik) = ln
 

(yik + Y )
b
(yik + Y )
b + Z
+
(1  )
G
!
:
By di¤erentiation, we get
A0 (yik) =
1
 (yik+Y )
b
(yik+Y )
b+Z
+ (1 )
G
 bZ (yik + Y )b 1
(yik + Y )
b + Z
2 :
Since b  1; the numerator is decreasing in yik: The denominator is increasing
in yik: Hence A00 (yik) < 0:
Now to the second term. Let
P
j 6=i x
a
jk =: X for notational convenience.
Then
B (xik) = ln


xaik
xaik +X
+
(1  )
m

:
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Di¤erentiating,
B0 (xik) =
1

xaik
xaik+X
+ (1 )
m
 aXxa 1ik
(xaik +X)
2 :
Since a  1; the numerator is decreasing in xik: The denominator is increasing
in xik: Hence B00 (xik) < 0:
Now consider the third term. For notational convenience, dene
W :=
 X
g
X
j
(1  xjg   yjg)
!
+ xik + yik:
Then C (xik; yik) = h ln (W   xik   yik) : Di¤erentiating, we nd
@2C
@x2ik
=
@2C
@y2ik
=
@2C
@xik@yik
=   h
(W   xik   yik)2
< 0
The determinant of the Hessian matrix is zero. Hence the Hessian matrix is
negative semidenite, and C (xik; yik) is concave in (xik; yik) :
Finally, we can put things together and show that lnuik is strictly concave
in (xi1; yi1) :
Write ln (uik (x; y)) = A (y)+B (x)+C (x; y) : For any (x; y), (x0; y0) 2 R2+
and any t 2 (0; 1) ; we have
ln (uik (tx+ (1  t)x0; ty + (1  t) y0)) =
= A (ty + (1  t) y0) +B (tx+ (1  t)x0) + C (tx+ (1  t)x0; ty + (1  t) y0) <
< tA (y) + (1  t)A (y0) + tB (x) + (1  t)B (x0) + tC (x; y) + (1  t)C (x0; y0) =
= t ln (uik (x; y)) + (1  t) ln (uik (x0; y0)) :
Hence lnuik (xik; yik) is strictly concave in (xik; yik) :
A.2 Utility is log-concave if  =  = 1
If  =  = 1; the we nd that
A0 (yik) =
b
yik + Y
  b (yik + Y )
b 1
(yik + Y )
b + Z
and
A00 (yik) =   b
(yik + Y )
2 

(yik + Y )
b + Z

b (b  1) (yik + Y )b 2  

b (yik + Y )
b 1
2

(yik + Y )
b + Z
2 :
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Simplifying, we get
A00 (yik) =   b
(yik + Y )
2Z
(yik + Y )
b + Z + (yik + Y )
b b
(yik + Y )
b + Z
2 < 0:
Further,
B0 (xik) =
a
xik
  ax
a 1
ik
(xaik +X)
and
B00 (xik) =   a
(xik)
2  
(xaik +X) a (a  1)xa 2i1  
 
axa 1ik
2
(xaik +X)
2 :
Simplifying, we get
B00 (xik) =  aXx
a
ik +X + ax
a
ik
x2ik (x
a
ik +X)
2 < 0:
As above, it follows that lnuik is strictly concave in (xik; yik) : Note that we
needed no upper bounds on a and b.
A.3 Existence of symmetric equilibria in the rent-seeking
model: two examples
This section studies two examples for the (non-) existence of symmetric equi-
libria in the rent-seeking model discussed in section 6.
Example 1 Let a = b = 1; G = 2; and n = 4: Then there exists a
symmetric equilibrium of the rent-seeking model, where
x =
1
8
v; y =
1
16
v: (32)
To prove this, suppose that three players behave according to equation
(32). The problem of the remaining player is
y + 1
16
v
y + 3
16
v
x
x+ 1
8
v
v   x  y ! max
x;y
subject to x  0; y  0: (33)
We have to show that the solution of this problem is given in equation (32).
1. The player can always ensure zero utility by choosing x = y = 0: Hence
we can constrain our search to pairs (x; y) with x + y  v: Now we
have a maximization problem of a continuous function over a compact
domain. By the Weierstrass theorem, a solution exists.
29
2. The constraint x  0 is not binding in the optimum. Suppose it were.
Then utility is at most zero. But the player can get a positive utility
by behaving as in equation (32). Contradiction.
3. The constraint y  0 is not binding, either. Suppose it were. Then the
best the player can do is to choose x  0 to solve
1
3
x
x+ 1
8
v
v   x! max
x0
The objective function is concave. The optimal choice of x is given by
x =  1
8
v +
1
12
v
p
6 > 0:
The utility equals
1
3
 1
8
v + 1
12
p
6v
 1
8
v + 1
12
p
6v + 1
8
v
v  

 1
8
+
1
12
p
6

v =

11
24
  1
6
p
6

v
But by behaving as in equation (32), the player gets utility
v
4
  v
8
  v
16
=
v
16
>

11
24
  1
6
p
6

v:
Contradiction.
4. Of course, the constraint x+ y  v is not binding, either.
5. Hence, the rst order conditions have to hold at the optimum:
2
16
v 
y + 3
16
v
2 xx+ 1
8
v
v = 1 (34)
y + 1
16
v
y + 3
16
v
1
8
v 
x+ 1
8
v
2v = 1
6. Dividing these equations yields
32x
8x+ v
(16y + 3v) (16y + v)
= 1:
Solving for x we get two possibilities: x =  y  3
16
v or x = y+ 1
16
v: Since
x > 0 and y > 0 at the optimum, we can exclude the rst possibility.
This leaves us with
x = y +
1
16
v: (35)
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7. Plugging this back into equation (34) gives us
2
16
v 
y + 3
16
v
2 y + 116vy + 1
16
v + 1
8
v
v = 1
or
32v2
16y + v
(16y + 3v)3
= 1
This equation has three roots, one positive root yI = 116v; and two
negative roots: yII =
   5
16
+ 1
8
p
5

v   3:3  10 2v < 0 and yIII =   5
16
  1
8
p
5

v   0:59v < 0: Hence we know that y = v
16
:
8. Plugging this back in equation (35) we get x = v
8
:
9. The problem (33) has a solution (step 1), the solution satises x > 0
and y > 0 (steps 2 and 3), and it is a critical point (step 5). The
only critical point satisfying x > 0 and y > 0 is x = v
8
and y = v
16
;
as in equation (32) (steps 6-8). Hence, the solution is indeed given by
equation (32). This completes the proof.
It might be reassuring to check the local second order condition. The
Hessean corresponding to the objective function in problem (33) is
H (x; y) =
"
 128 16y+v
(16y+3v)(8x+v)3
v2 256
(16y+3v)2(8x+v)2
v3
256
(16y+3v)2(8x+v)2
v3  8192 x
(16y+3v)3(8x+v)
v2
#
Hence,
H
v
8
;
v
16

=
   8
v
4
v
4
v
  8
v

is negative denite, and the local second order condition holds.
Example 2 Let a = b = 1; G = 2; and n = 10: Then no symmetric
equilibrium exists in the rent-seeking model.
To see this, note that there is a unique candidate for a symmetric equi-
librium, where
x =
(10  2)
102
v; y =
v
102
:
In this candidate equilibrium, a player gets utility v=100: However, if a player
deviates to y = 0 and x = 6v=(100); he gets
4v
100
4v
100
+ 5v
100
6v
100
6v
100
+ 4
 
8
100
v
v   6v
100
=
29
2850
v >
v
100
:
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